Mahmud Shah, Candidate in Political Science, research officer, lecturer in Moscow State University of Foreign Affairs (MGIMO) of the MFA of Russia

The USA and its NATO and ISAF partners have to realize that the Afghan problem is not to be solved by military means. It is just SCO as a regional intergovernmental organization, members of which are the most interested in the soonest stabilization of situation in Afghanistan, which must convince them of it. The SCO that incorporates in one capacity or another all the adjacent states interested in normalization of situation in Afghanistan, could contribute to enhancement of relationship and understanding between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as to Iran’s involvement in settlement of the Afghan problem.

Today’s and future problems of the USA anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan arouse concern both of its direct participants, and of parties interested in the Afghan problem settlement. This campaign has resulted in new activation of terrorist groups, many fold increase in narcotic drugs production, illegal migration, illegal weapons trade and other security threats to Afghanistan itself and all Eurasian countries. However, Talibs, Hekmatyar’s Islamic party and other resistant forces are supported by not less than the three parts of the adult population of the country.

The USA, international forces and government troops proved to be unable to suppress the resistance movement. Meanwhile, anti-government forces do not have resources enough for attacks on the large territory and getting it under control. Established balance impedes neither narcotic drugs production, nor development of irreconcilable armed opposition detachments.

Economic assistance to Afghanistan proved to be absolutely ineffective. The government demonstrated absence of clear objectives, plans and real conceptions of the country development. In the midst of this narcotic drugs production grows up.

The Pushtun problem, i.e. the largest ethnical group’s relationship with other peoples, requires a special attention. Traditionally, a dominating role in opposition to the Pan-Pushtun aspirations threatening in effect to pull Pakistan down, have been assigned to the Tajiks, the second by number ethnical group in Afghanistan. In due time, Kabul’s passing into the Tajiks's hands caused disintegration within multinational Afghanistan. Spontaneous reunion of the Afghan pushtuns and Pakistan “brothers” across the Durand line constituted a serious menace to Islamabad. Though today the “pushtun nationalism” is torn between pro- and anti-Kabul tendencies, being partially crossed with the Talibs, it is acquiring more and more self-contained significance.

The Americans and their NATO allies, represented in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), did not succeed to eliminate the Talibs system reproduction. The latter assumed the offensive by big arrays. Their operations are not only of defensive, but also of offensive nature. Islamabad’s and Kabul’s impact hardly covers the area with a width of about 150 kilometers along the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier, where a spontaneously formed and not regulated Pushtun “emirate” bears a strong destabilizing influence on Afghanistan and Pakistan. The situation was also aggravated by the fact that on October 2004 in the North-Western province the Muttahid Majlis-i-amal (ММА) parties’ coalition came into power, representatives of which openly support the Talibs.

The USA's military expenditures for operations in Afghanistan are continually growing. Every month the Pentagon spends on these tasks about a billion dollars. Trying to minimize its losses, NATO Command counted on bombing attacks, resulting in considerable victims among civilian population, and thus still more provoking growth of anti-western and anti-government mood in the Afghan society. Whereas, the European military garrisons in the south of the country factually defense themselves. They prefer to sit out behind concrete walls and barbed wire entanglement.

Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai asks to deploy military units not in Central Afghanistan, but at the border with Pakistan, where threat of terrorism comes from. The USA plan in the near future to create in the east and south-east of Afghanistan 20 border terminals and frontier points "for the purpose of security situation improvement."

It is remarkable that President-elect Barack Obama and the Western allies of the USA consider asking all Afghanistan neighbors for assistance. Moreover, the Americans gradually come to realize necessity for negotiations with moderate representatives of the Taliban movement. Thus, Robert Gaits, appearing on October on the Al-Jazira TV channel, noted that the USA is ready for reconciliation with the Taliban for the sake of peace. Khamid Karzai tries to establish good relations with the Taliban too.

However, the problem is the Afghan settlement is of no direct interest to the Americans. Their presence in Afghanistan is a very important leverage for them to manipulate geopolitical processes in Eurasia.

All that creates favorable conditions for the SCO’s active integration into the Afghan settlement process. Difficult military and political situation in Afghanistan is one of the main obstacles in the way of regional integration and realization of a high priority common interest of Central Asia countries, connected with providing alternative and complementary transportation lines. Whereas American projects such as Professor S. Frederic Starr’s offer to reconstitute the Great Central Asia as a considerable economic zone with Afghanistan as a center, are fraught with Afghan situation’s influence extension over the whole region and "Afghanization” of the post-Soviet Central Asian space.

The USA and its NATO and ISAF partners have to realize that the Afghan problem is not to be solved by military means. It is just SCO as a regional intergovernmental organization, members of which are the most interested in the soonest stabilization of situation in Afghanistan, which must convince them of it. The SCO that incorporates in one capacity or another all the adjacent states interested in normalization of situation in Afghanistan, could contribute to enhancement of relationship and understanding between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as to Iran’s involvement in settlement of the Afghan problem.

SCO’s support can become an essential factor in providing the continuing negotiations process seeking to termination of hostilities and transform the political system of the state on behalf of all levels and groups of Afghan society without exception. Nowadays, all subjects of Afghanistan policy must take part in it: government institutions, political parties, regional and tribal representatives, religious figures. Here the inter-Tajik settlement’s experience which had involved Iran and Russia in 90s should be followed. It is of importance that both Russia and Iran support a wide representation in the Afghan government of minority groups, leaders of which maintain relations with Moscow and Tehran.

Unfortunately, SCO is regarded in NATO as an analogue to the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and relations with it are neglected, just as with CSTO. However, SCO is not a military-political bloc but a political economic organization that deals with complex security problems. SCO’s participation in the Afghan settlement is of great importance also just because the only real chance to solve it is healthy economic situation formation in the country.

It is significant that Russia and China assist Afghanistan in construction of energetics objects, traffic and tunnel infrastructure. In 2002 SCO recognized as useful development of anti-narcotic security system along Afghanistan border. In 2004 an agreement for cooperation in struggle against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs was signed. It is important to continue struggle against the menaces of terrorism and narcotics and activate international cooperation for strengthening anti-narcotic and financial “security belts” along Afghanistan border. It is necessary to create within the framework of SCO mechanisms for joint control of the situation on the border with Afghanistan.

Cooperation in strengthening the Tajik-Afghan border and mutual assistance of the SCO member states’ customs and frontier services in improving their technology intensiveness and logistical status is of especial importance. Moreover, it is necessary to make maximal use of frontier trade and formation of border economic cooperation zones to strengthen a security buffer zone (in the northern part of Afghanistan) for SCO’s adjacent countries. Systems programmes of 3 million of Afghan nomads transition to sedentism are not of less importance.

Certainly, the SCO’s unilateral actions without real partnership with NATO and UN, as well as with the Organization of the Islamic Conference, can not be effective. Even though the format of international mechanism of the Afghan settlement does not provide for direct participation of international organizations, the SCO countries must work out coordinated position and uphold it.

The article was prepared by materials of the Moscow International seminar “Afghan syndrome: is there a way out of the deadlock?” and published on the site Afghanistan.Ru. Abridged.