This year’s anniversary of Russia’s pullout from Afghanistan is approaching amid broad discussion of the prospects of another pullout from that conflict-ripped country – the U.S. forces’ withdrawal. The issue seems to top the debates in the expert community focused on Afghanistan. Although it does not seem appropriate to trace direct analogies between 1989 and 2011, certain similarities still cannot be ignored. It is clear that the US exodus from Afghanistan will repeat the Soviet experience in some aspects.

What similarities could be found in the organization of the Russian and American forces’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, exactly? Firstly, the routes they used to move their task forces. Just like the Soviet forces before them, the U.S. troops will be probably transported along the “northern corridor” through the north of Afghanistan - to the states of Central Asia. That “corridor,” in turn, consists of two routes – the west route leading to Turkmenistan (near Kushka) and the east one to Uzbekistan (near Termez). Therefore, a large part of the U.S. forces will be relocated to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, creating the Turkmen and Uzbek groups of American troops - one major result of the U.S. forces’ withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The timeframe for the pullout is another similarity. The Soviet troops pulled out in several stages. The bulk of the limited contingent crossed the Soviet-Afghan border from May to August 1989, which is the best time in the local climate. It is obvious that the busiest phase of the U.S. withdrawal will be spring or summer too. However, unlike the Soviet troops, the United States will probably take several years to pull out, so troops will have to march all year round.

The third similarity is how the pullout is organized. The Soviet High Command began with redeploying its remote garrisons located in eastern and southern provinces of Afghanistan. Those were followed by garrisons stationed in provincial centers and then by those from western and northern Afghanistan. The U.S. pullout is likely to be organized in the same way.  As in 1989, they will try to retain control of its old strongholds in the provinces of Khost, Paktia, Nangarhar, Kandahar, Zabul, Helmand, Herat, as well as in the northern province of Kunduz. It will be of fundamental importance to U.S. forces (and the Afghan security forces) to keep control of the cities of Khost, Gardez and Jalalabad that cover Kabul from the east (where the Haqqani group is now operating), as well as Kandahar, Lashkar Gah and Heart that ensure the control over the southern and western areas of the country.

The next similarity is special security regime that will be maintained in Kabul. The Afghan capital has a symbolic significance for the fragmented country and it plays an important role in the Afghan political process. As long as the central government sits in Kabul, no opposition can declare a victory, even though it controls most of the country.

The Soviet leadership made every effort to keep President Najibullah in control in Kabul after the withdrawal of troops. It is obvious that the U.S. command will also help Hamid Karzai’s government maintain security of the Afghan capital.

And the fifth similarity is the post-pullout cooperation. As the Soviet leadership after 1989, the Americans will have to significantly increase the volume of military and nonmilitary supplies to Afghanistan to provide a "safety cushion" for the local officials after the withdrawal of troops is final.

However, despite all the similarities between the Soviet and American withdrawal from Afghanistan, there are important differences between them – mainly political ones.

First of all, the global political situations in which the decisions to pull out were made were totally different. The Soviet Union in 1989 entered a system-wide social, economic and political crisis. Moscow abandoned its geopolitical ambitions, giving ground in Eastern Europe as well as other regions. Therefore, the Soviet Union could not fulfill its commitments to the Afghan government. At the same time, the political crisis in Kabul showed the government’s inability to suppress an armed opposition with force. Moscow and Kabul did not have a position of strength in the negotiations they initiated with the Mujahideen.

This time around, an armed opposition has failed to take over the country and has no power to recapture the military-political initiative. The Taliban got restricted to particular borderline areas and, unlike the Mujahideen of the 1980s, they cannot launch a major offensive against Kabul or other major centers of the country from those areas. As a result, militants cannot do more than stage terrorist attacks, which cannot bring down the political regime in Afghanistan.

Public opinion is largely anti-Taliban and supports a Western-style modernization of the country. Finally, the United States, although struggling with the repercussions of the global economic crisis, remains a stable country interested in strengthening its influence in Afghanistan and neighboring states of Central and South Asia.

Therefore, the U.S. troops’ withdrawal is just a regrouping of forces aiming to establish a more effective U.S. control over one of the key enclaves of the Middle East. America is leaving Afghanistan to stay in the region.

Secondly, unlike 1989 when the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan triggered a withdrawal of Russian forces from the Central Asian republics (i.e., cut Moscow's sphere of influence), the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan will in fact extend the zone of U.S. influence in Central Asia.

While keeping control over Afghanistan through a system of military bases, the U.S. forces will be able to gain footholds at least in two former Soviet republics, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. There is no doubt that the subsequent expansion of the American sphere of influence in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will be only a matter of time.

Finally, the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 increased Moscow’s geo-political isolation. While it abandoned some of its allies, the Soviet Union failed to attract any new partners. The United States, on the contrary, seems to be successfully combining the pullout from Afghanistan with building new coalitions in the region, gaining new allies under the guise of fighting international terrorism and radical Islamism. No one wanted to help Moscow in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Americans have no problem finding allies who wish to help them with the Afghan mission. The Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan hastened the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. The U.S. pullout from Afghanistan may culminate in the establishment of a new Washington-led military-political bloc including Afghanistan and Central Asian countries.